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Article 4

Empowering States When It Matters

A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO PREEMPTION

Erwin Chemerinsky'
I.

INTRODUCTION

When historians look back at the Rehnquist Court,
undoubtedly they will say that its most significant impact on
the law has been with regard to federalism. In the last decade,
the Court has limited the scope of Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment;1 revived the Tenth Amendment as a constraint on
federal power;' and greatly expanded the scope of state
sovereign immunity.'
One would expect that a Court concerned with
federalism and states' rights also would be narrowing the scope
of federal preemption of state laws. Narrowing the
© 2004 Erwin Chemerinsky. All Rights Reserved.
Alston and Bird Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. This
Article is part of the David G. Trager Public Policy Symposium: Our New Federalism?
National Authority and Local Autonomy in the War on Terror. I want to thank Annika
Martin for her excellent research assistance.
' See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun
Free School Zone Act as exceeding the scope of Congress's commerce power); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the civil damages provision in the
Violence Against Women Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
(invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as exceeding the scope of
Congress's Section Five powers).
' See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating
provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act as violating the Tenth Amendment);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating the Brady Handgun Control
Act as violating the Tenth Amendment).
' See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)
(limiting Congress's power to authorize suits against state governments).
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circumstances of federal preemption leaves more room for state
and local governments to act. The Court has done quite the
opposite, though. Over the last several years, the Supreme
Court repeatedly has found preemption of important state
laws, and done so when federal law was silent about
preemption or even when it explicitly preserved state laws.
For example, in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,'
the Court found preemption of a state products liability
common law cause of action notwithstanding a statutory
provision that expressly provided that "[clompliance with" a
federal safety standard did "not exempt any person from any
liability under the common law."5 In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly,' the Court found that federal law preempted state
regulation of outdoor billboards and signs in stores advertising
cigarettes. In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,' the
Court invalidated a Massachusetts law that restricted the
ability of the state and its agency to purchase goods and
services from companies that did business with Burma. Most
recently, in American InsuranceAssociation v. Garamendi,the
Supreme Court found preemption of a California law requiring
that insurance companies doing business in that state disclose
Holocaust-era insurance policies The Court invalidated the
California statute despite the absence of any federal law
expressing an intent to preempt state law, basing its holding
on the murky "dormant foreign affairs power of the President."
At the very least, these and other cases like them are
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's oft-stated presumption
against preemption. One illustrative example of the statement
appears in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr:
[Blecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal
system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly
pre-empt state-law causes of action. In all pre-emption cases, and
particularly in those in which Congress has "legislated... in a field
which the States have traditionally occupied," we "start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to

' 529 U.S. 861 (2000). For a more detailed discussion of Geier, see infra text
accompanying notes 17-21.
' Id. at 868 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988)).
6 533 U.S. 525 (2001). For a more detailed discussion of Lorillard, see infra
text accompanying notes 22-28.
' 530 U.S. 363 (2000). For a more detailed discussion of Crosby, see infra
text accompanying notes 29-31.
' 539 U.S. 396 (2003). For a more detailed discussion of American Insurance,
see infra text accompanying notes 32-42.
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be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress."9

Contrary to this statement and its homage to the presumption
against preemption, this Article will argue that the recent
Supreme Court preemption cases clearly put the presumption
in favor of preemption."
More profoundly, the Court's recent decisions finding
preemption expose the political content of its federalism
rulings. The Court has eagerly found preemption of state laws
regulating business, such as tobacco companies, the auto
industry, and insurance companies. On the other hand, most of
the Supreme Court's federalism decisions invalidating federal
laws have struck down civil rights laws - such as the Violence
Against Women Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans
with Disabilities Act. Comparing the Court's preemption
rulings with its decisions limiting Congress's powers under the
Commerce Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment reveals that what animates the Rehnquist Court
is not a concern for states' rights and federalism. Rather, the
Court is hiding its value choices to limit civil rights laws and to
protect business from regulation in decisions that seem to be
about very specific doctrines of constitutional law, such as the
scope of the commerce power and the circumstances of
preemption.
This paper is divided into four additional parts. Part II
describes the broad view of preemption reflected in the
Supreme Court's recent decisions. Part III explains why these
decisions are undesirable, and Part IV offers a different
approach to federalism. Part V briefly concludes. My broad
thesis is that federalism should be reconceptualized as being
about empowering government at all levels, rather than
limiting power. The genius of having multiple levels of
government is there are several different actors to advance
rights and liberties. From this perspective, congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause and Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment should be broadly interpreted, as it
was from 1937 until the 1990s. Correspondingly, preemption of
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 468, 485 (1996) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), and Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med.
Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985)).
10 For an argument against the presumption against preemption, see Viet D.
Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085 (2000).
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state and local laws should be narrowed. My specific thesis in
the arena of preemption is that courts should find preemption
only if a law expressly preempts state and local action or if
there is a direct conflict between federal and state law. From
this perspective, the Supreme Court's recent preemption cases
are wrong in invalidating desirable state and local laws
creating liability for injured consumers, protecting children
from tobacco advertisements, and requiring insurance
companies to disclose their Holocaust-era policies.
Obviously, a full exposition and defense of my
federalism-as-empowerment thesis is beyond the scope of this
paper. But I do want to argue that such a radically different
approach to federalism would mean a dramatic change for the
better in the area of preemption analysis. States' rights are not
an end in themselves. They are a means to the crucial
objectives of advancing freedom and enriching the lives of those
in the United States. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's
decisions limiting federal power in the area of civil rights and
invalidating desirable state laws based on preemption have
had exactly the opposite effects.
II. THE DENIAL OF STATES' CHOICES: THE COURT'S BROAD
VIEW OF PREEMPTION

Article VI of the Constitution contains the Supremacy
Clause, which provides that the Constitution, and laws and
treaties made pursuant to it, are the supreme law of the land.
When a state law conflicts with federal law, the federal law
controls and the state law bows under the principle of federal
supremacy." As the Supreme Court declared: "Winder the
Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is
derived, any state law, however clearly within a State's
acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to
federal law, must yield."" In Gade v. National Solid Waste

"1See Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992)
(deriving preemption from the supremacy clause); but see Stephen A. Gardbaum, The
Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767 (1994); S. Candice Hoke, Transcending
Conventional Supremacy: A Reconstruction of the Supremacy Clause, 24 CONN. L. REV.
829 (1992) (arguing that only some preemption should be based on the supremacy
clause).
12 Gade, 505 U.S. at 1084 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824), Chief Justice John Marshall said:
"[Aicts of the State Legislatures ... [that] interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of
Congress [are to be invalidated because] [i]n every such case, the act of Congress... is
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Management Association, the Court summarized the tests for
preemption:
Pre-emption may be either expressed or implied, and is compelled
whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's
language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose. Absent
explicit pre-emptive language, we have recognized at least two types
of implied pre-emption: field pre-emption, where the scheme of
federal regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,
and conflict pre-emption, where compliance with both federal and
state regulations is a physical impossibility, or where state law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."

The Supreme Court has recognized that these categories
are often difficult to apply. The Court once remarked that there
is not "an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive
constitutional yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be no
one crystal clear distinctly marked formula."" In the vast
majority of cases in which a court must decide whether state
law is rendered invalid by related federal law, the federal law
itself is ambiguous as to whether it precludes state and local
law. Therefore, a choice must be made as to whether federal
law should be presumed to preempt state law.
The Supreme Court correctly has said that concerns
about federalism and state authority justify a presumption
against preemption. The Court has observed: "Congress . . .
should manifest its intention [to preempt state and local laws]
clearly.... The exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to

be presumed." 5 Recently, the Court emphasized that states

supreme; and the law of State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not
controverted, must yield to it."
"' 505 U.S. at 98 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In an earlier

case, Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), the Supreme Court identified three
situations where preemption could be found:
First, the scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it ....
Second, the federal statutes touch a field in which the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system must be assumed to preclude enforcement
of state laws on the same subject .... Third, [where] enforcement of state...
acts presents a serious danger of conflict with the administration of the
federal program.
Id. at 502-505 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
14 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
11 New York State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973)
(citation omitted).
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"are independent sovereigns in our federal system" and
16
therefore there is a presumption against finding preemption.
The Supreme Court's recent preemption decisions are
striking because they are so at odds with the Court's insistence
on deference to the states in Commerce Clause and state
sovereign immunity cases. To illustrate, I want to briefly
describe several recent cases and how they put the
presumption in favor of preemption. In this section, my focus is
descriptive, focusing on how the Court has placed the
presumption in favor of preemption; the normative criticism of
this approach and these rulings is in Part III.
A.

Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.17

Alexis Geier bought a 1987 model Honda Accord. She
was seriously injured when the car crashed into a tree. She
sued, claiming that the absence of airbags was a design defect
that was responsible for her injuries. The Department of
Transportation had promulgated rules pursuant to the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act for 1987
automobiles. The regulations required that cars have passive
restraint systems and gave manufacturers choices as to how to
comply; one choice was to install airbags, another choice was to
install the lap and shoulder belts that were in Geier's car. The
defendant argued that Geier's suit was preempted by federal
law because it built the car in compliance with the federal
safety requirements.
The problem with this regulatory framework is that the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, which was the
basis for the Department of Transportation regulations, had a
savings clause to the effect that nothing within the law was
meant to preempt any other cause of action that might exist.
The law expressly said that "[clompliance with" a federal safety
standard does "not exempt any person from any liability under
the common law." 8 Geier argued that this provision prevented
a finding of federal preemption.
The Supreme Court rejected Geier's argument and
found federal preemption notwithstanding the savings clause.
Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, said that this was not
16

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (citing Hillsborough Cty.

v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985)).
17 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
16 Id. at 867 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988)).

2004]

DIFFERENTAPPROACH TO PREEMPTION

1319

a situation of express preemption, but instead conflict
preemption.1" The Court found that allowing state liability for
cars made in compliance with the federal safety standard
would conflict with the federal law. Justice Breyer said that the
savings clause did not foreclose preemption because there was
no indication that Congress wanted to permit lawsuits when
cars were made in compliance with the Department of
Transportation's safety regulations.0
The only way to make sense of the case is to see it as
putting a presumption in favor of preemption.21 The federal
statute expressly said that it did not preempt state law tort
suits. Thus, there was no conflict between Geier's state cause of
action and any provision of the relevant federal law. Yet the
Court nonetheless ruled in favor Honda and deemed a state
tort action to be preempted.
B.

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly2

In this case, the Court invalidated a Massachusetts law
that prohibited outdoor advertising for cigarettes, such as
billboards, within 1,000 feet of a playground or school.2 The
Supreme Court relied on the language of a federal law adopted
in 1969 that proscribes any "requirement or prohibition based
on smoking and health . . . imposed under State law with
respect to the advertising or promotion of ...cigarettes." The
Court reviewed the history of federal regulation of cigarette
advertising and concluded:
In the 1969 amendments, Congress not only enhanced its scheme to
warn the public about the hazards of cigarette smoking, but also
sought to protect the public, including youth, from being inundated
with images of cigarette smoking in advertising. In pursuit of the
latter goal, Congress banned electronic media advertising of
cigarettes. And to the extent that Congress contemplated additional
19

Id. at 869-70.

20

id.

The dissent by Justice Stevens forcefully makes this point. See id. at 907

2'1

(Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Susan Raeker-Jordan, A Study in Judicial Sleight of
Hand: Did Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. Eradicate the Presumption Against
Preemption?, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (2002).
22

533 U.S. 525 (2001).

23

The Court found that the Massachusetts law was preempted in its

regulation of advertising of cigarettes. As for the regulation of advertising of cigars and
smokeless tobacco, which are not the subject of federal regulation, the Court found that
the law violated the First Amendment.
21 Lorillard, 533
U.S. at 537 (quoting Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. 1334(b)).
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targeted regulation of cigarette advertising, it vested that authority
in the FTC. 5

Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, argued that the
state law was not preempted because it regulated the location
and not the content of cigarette advertisements."6 The majority,
however, rejected this distinction and declared
But the content/location distinction cannot be squared with the
language of the pre-emption provision, which reaches all
"requirements" and "prohibitions" "imposed under State law." A
distinction between the content of advertising and the location of
advertising in the FCLAA also cannot be reconciled with Congress'
own location-based restriction, which bans advertising in electronic
media, but not elsewhere.27

Again, this case can be understood only if it is seen as
putting a presumption in favor of preemption.' The federal law
was designed to limit cigarette advertising so as to protect
children. The federal preemption provision was meant to keep
states from adopting conflicting requirements for warning
labels on cigarette packages. There is nothing in the law which
says or implies that all state regulation of cigarette advertising
is preempted by federal law. Indeed, the Massachusetts law
advances the goals of the federal statute by protecting children
from tobacco ads. The federal statute has nothing to do with
whether there can be billboards near schools or whether ads in
stores need to be a certain level above the floor. These, as the
dissent points out, go entirely to placement, an issue not
addressed by the federal law. Nonetheless, the Court protected
the tobacco industry and invalidated the Massachusetts
statute.
C.

Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council'

Massachusetts adopted a law that prohibited the state
and its agencies from purchasing goods or services from
companies that do business with Burma (Myanmar). The state
adopted this law because of human rights violations in that
nation. The Supreme Court unanimously found that federal
Id. at 547-48.

Id. at 592-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
27 Id. at 548-49.
' My focus here is only the preemption issue and not whether the
Massachusetts law violates the First Amendment.
21

530 U.S. 363 (2000).
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law preempted the state law. Justice Souter, writing for the
Court, explained that Congress had enacted a sanctions law
against Burma. He found that this preempted states from
imposing their own sanctions.
Justice Souter rejected the State's argument that its
policy furthered the federal objective of imposing sanctions on a
nation that violated basic norms of human rights. Justice
Souter wrote: "The conflicts are not rendered irrelevant by the
State's argument that there is no real conflict between the
statutes because they share the same goals and because some
companies may comply with both sets of restrictions. The fact
of a common end hardly neutralizes conflicting means."3
Justice Souter said that the existence of the state law
undermines the President's capacity.. . for effective diplomacy. It is
not merely that the differences between the state and federal Acts in
scope and type of sanctions threaten to complicate discussions; they
compromise the very capacity of the President to speak for the
nation with one voice in dealing with other governments."1

The decision, though unanimous, again must be seen as
putting a presumption in favor of preemption. Congress had
not expressed or implied any intent to preempt states from
imposing sanctions and the state law was not inconsistent with
the federal law. There was no conflict between the
Massachusetts law and anything done by the President. The
state was simply choosing how it would spend its taxpayers'
money and whom it would do business with. Likewise, many
state and local governments adopted similar laws refusing to
contract with companies doing business in South Africa at the
time of apartheid. Nonetheless, the Court found preemption.
D.

American Insurance Association v. Garamend

2

California's Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of
1999 (HVIRA) required any insurer doing business in the state
to disclose information about all policies that company sold in
Europe between 1920 and 1945. As Justice Ginsburg noted in
her dissent:
For insurance policies issued in Germany and other countries under
Nazi control, historical evidence bears out, the combined forces of the

32

Id. at 379.
Id. at 380.
539 U.S. 396 (2003).
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German Government and the insurance industry engaged in
larcenous takings of gigantic proportions. For example, insurance
policies covered many of the Jewish homes and businesses destroyed
in the state-sponsored pogrom known as Kristallnacht. By order of
the Nazi regime, claims arising out of the officially enabled
destruction were made payable not to the insured parties, but to the
State. In what one historian called a 'charade concocted by insurers
and ministerial officials,' insurers satisfied property loss claims by
paying the State only a fraction of their full value."

Despite some efforts by the federal government,
insurance companies had been largely successful in
stonewalling and not disclosing their Holocaust-era policies. To
remedy this, and to protect its many residents who are
Holocaust survivors or their descendants, California enacted a
law that declared that "[i]nsurance companies doing business
in the State of California have a responsibility to ensure that
any involvement they or their related companies may have had
with insurance policies of Holocaust victims [is] disclosed to the
state."34 The Act required insurance companies doing business
in California to disclose information concerning insurance
policies they or their affiliates sold in Europe between 1920 and
1945, and directed California's Insurance Commissioner to
store the information in a publicly accessible "Holocaust Era
Insurance Registry."5 The Commissioner was further directed
to suspend the license of any insurer that failed to comply with
the Act's reporting requirements. 3' These measures, the Act
declared, are "necessary to protect the claims and interests of
California residents, as well as to encourage the development
of a resolution to these issues through the international process
or through direct action by the State of California, as
necessary."3
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, found
that the California law was preempted by federal law. The
Court said that the statute interfered with the President's
conduct of the nation's foreign policy and was therefore
preempted. The Court focused on executive agreements that
the President had negotiated with Germany, France, and

Id. at 430-31 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id. at 434 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Holocaust Victim Insurance
Relief Act of 1999, CALIF. INS. CODE § 13801(e)).
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing CALIF. INS. CODE § 13803).
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing CALIF. INS. CODE § 13806).
' 539 U.S. at 434 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting CALIF. INS. CODE §

13801(f)).
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Austria. 8 However, the problem with this argument is that the
California law did not conflict with any executive agreement
and as Justice Souter, writing for the majority, admitted,
"petitioners and the United States as amicus curiae both have
to acknowledge that the agreements include no preemption
clause."'9
The Court relied on its prior decision in Zschernig v.
Miller, which created a dormant foreign affairs power of the
0 In
President."
Zschernig, the Court declared unconstitutional
an Oregon probate statute that prohibited inheritance by a
nonresident alien, absent showings that the foreign heir would
take the property "without confiscation" by his home country
and that American citizens would enjoy reciprocal rights of
inheritance there. As Justice Souter explained in his majority
opinion in American Insurance, the Court in Zschernig found
"that state action with more than incidental effect on foreign
affairs is preempted, even absent any affirmative federal
activity in the subject area of the state law, and hence without
any showing of conflict.""
Even though no later decision had relied on Zschernig,
the Court said that the case provided a basis for invalidating
California's law. The Court stressed that the California
disclosure statute limited what the President might do in some
hypothetical future negotiations. Moreover, Justice Souter said:
If any doubt about the clarity of the conflict remained, however, it
would have to be resolved in the National Government's favor, given
the weakness of the State's interest, against the backdrop of
traditional state legislative subject matter, in regulating disclosure
of European
Holocaust-era insurance policies in the manner of
2
HVIRA.'

At the very least, one can understand Garamendi as
creating an enormous presumption in favor of federal
preemption of state laws in cases where state law has
international implications. In the absence of any express
preemption or any conflict with federal law, the Court
nonetheless found preemption simply because the California
statute was seen as touching on an issue of foreign policy. The
California law, of course, regulated businesses operating within
Id. at 408.
Id. at 417.
4'

389 U.S. 429 (1968).

American Insurance, 539 U.S. at 418.
" Id. at 425.
'
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its borders and did not directly deal with foreign nations.
Nonetheless, the Court found that a broad "dormant foreign
affairs power" of the President was sufficient to preclude the
state law protecting California's residents. It is hard to imagine
a stronger presumption in favor of preemption.
III. WHAT'S WRONG
PREEMPTION?

WITH

THE

COURT'S

APPROACH

TO

The prior section attempted to show that many
important recent preemption cases conflict with the Supreme
Court's oft-stated principle that federalism requires a
presumption against preemption. The decisions, of course, also
seem inconsistent with a Court committed to protecting states'
rights and federalism. In each case, the Court invalidated a
significant choice of a state government.
Yet this does not go far enough from a normative
perspective in explaining why the Court was wrong in these
cases. The underlying question must be, why have a
presumption against preemption?" The answer must begin
with an assessment of why federalism and concern about states
matter. Ironically, the Supreme Court decisions and academic
writings defending the use of federalism to invalidate federal
laws provide the best explanation of these values and show
why the recent preemption decisions are undesirable.
The Supreme Court has identified many values of
federalism. For example, it often is emphasized that states are
closer to the people and thus more likely to be responsive to
public needs and concerns. Professor David Shapiro clearly
summarizes this argument when he writes: "[O]ne of the
stronger arguments for a decentralized political structure is
that, to the extent the electorate is small, and elected
representatives are thus more immediately accountable to
individuals and their concerns, government is brought closer to
the people, and democratic ideals are more fully realized.""
Also, the Court has often spoken of the need to protect
federalism so that states can serve as laboratories for
experimentation. Justice Brandeis apparently first articulated
this idea when he declared:

For an argument against the presumption against preemption, see Viet
Dinh, supra note 10.
"

DAVID SHAPIRO FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 91-92 (1995).
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To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment might be fraught
with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. 5

More recent federalism decisions, too, have invoked this
notion. Justice Powell, dissenting in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, lamented that "the Court does
not explain how leaving the States virtually at the mercy of the
Federal Government, without recourse to judicial review, will
enhance their opportunities to experiment and serve as
'laboratories.'"4' Likewise, Justice O'Connor, dissenting in
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, stated
that the "Court's decision undermines the most valuable
aspects of our federalism. Courts and commentators frequently
have recognized that the 50 [sltates serve as laboratories for
the development of new social, economic, and political ideas."' 7
Another frequently advanced justification for federalism
is that the division of power between federal and state
governments advances liberty. For example, Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote: "This constitutionally mandated division of
authority 'was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of
our fundamental liberties.' ' . Similarly, Justice Scalia declared:
"The separation of the two spheres is one of the Constitution's
protections of liberty."" Justice O'Connor likewise wrote: "Just
as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches
of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation
of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of
power between the States and the Federal Government will
reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front."'
Although the relationship between these values and the
Supreme Court's decisions invalidating federal laws can be
questioned, 1 these considerations offer clear reasons for having
"

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,

dissenting).

469 U.S. 528, 567-68 n.13 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 787-88

(1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
4
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997).
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
"
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Does FederalismAdvance Liberty?, 47 WAYNE L.
REV. 911 (2002); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499
(1995).
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a presumption against preemption. Preempting state laws
limits the ability of states to make choices that are responsive
to their residents' desires, to experiment, and to advance
liberty and freedom within their boundaries. Simply put, a
broad vision of inferred preemption invalidates beneficial state
laws.
This can be seen by looking at the cases described in
Part II. In Geier, a state choice to allow injured citizens to
recover was preempted, notwithstanding a federal law
expressly preserving state causes of action. The benefits of
liability, in terms of compensating injured people and deterring
harmful products, are lost. In Lorillard,the Court preempted a
state law intended to protect children from tobacco advertising.
Putting aside the First Amendment issue and focusing just on
preemption, there can be no doubt that decreasing cigarette
consumption among children is a compelling state interest. The
Supreme Court frustrated the ability of states to respond to the
desire of their residents to restrict cigarette advertising to
children and stopped states from experimenting with new ways
of accomplishing this. In Crosby, the Court denied
Massachusetts the ability to decide how it wanted to spend its
taxpayers' money. The state law in Crosby provided that the
state would not contract with companies doing business in
Burma. The state was not making foreign policy for the United
States, but rather a choice as to how Massachusetts dollars
would be spent. In Garamendi,the Court denied California the
ability to help its many residents who were survivors of the
Holocaust or descendants of survivors. The state was
frustrated in its regulation of businesses within California, a
traditional prerogative of state governments. Also, the country
lost the benefit of seeing how California's experiment with this
type of regulation would work.
To be clear, I am not arguing that Congress lacked the
authority to preempt state laws in these areas. Rather, my
point is that in each of these cases desirable state laws were
lost because of the Court's abandoning the presumption against
preemption. The laws were desirable because of what they
sought to achieve: protecting injured consumers, decreasing
tobacco consumption among children, protecting human rights,
and protecting Holocaust survivors. The state laws also were
desirable in terms of the underlying values of federalism,
which the presumption in favor of preemption compromised in
each case.
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It is striking that in each of these four recent cases the
Supreme Court ruled in favor of business interests and against
state regulations. The four cases ruled, respectively, in favor of
the automobile industry, cigarette manufacturers, companies
doing business in Burma, and insurance companies. When
these cases are juxtaposed with the Supreme Court's
federalism decisions limiting federal power from the last
decade, a clear hierarchy of the Rehnquist Court's values
becomes clear. Two principles explain the vast majority of
these rulings:52
1) If there is a state challenge to a federal civil rights
law, the state wins and the federal interests lose.53
2) If there is a business challenge to a state regulatory
law, the state loses.
As to the first point, many of the Supreme Court's
decisions limiting congressional power in the name of
federalism have invalidated laws expanding civil rights. For
example, in United States v. Morrison,' the Court struck down
the civil damages provision of the Violence Against Women Act,
a law that allowed women to sue under federal law for gendermotivated violence, as exceeding the scope of Congress's powers
under the Commerce Clause. In City of Boerne v. Flores," the
Court struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
which sought by statute to expand religious freedom to what
previously had been protected under the Constitution. In Kimel
v. Florida Board of Regents,' and in Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett,7 the Court said that states
could not be sued for employment discrimination against the
elderly under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act or
against people with disabilities under Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act.' It is striking that in each of these cases,
" See David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90
HARV. L. REv. 293 (1976).
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Cedar
Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garrett, 526 U.S. 66 (1999); but see Nevada Dep't of Human
Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
528 U.S. 62 (2000).
17 531 U.S. 356
(2001).
' However, it should be noted that in Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), the Court held that state governments may be
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the Court limited Congress's powers to enforce and expand the
protection of civil rights.
This comparison undermines the view that concern for
states' rights or the application of a neutral methodology
animate the Rehnquist Court's decisions limiting federal
power. Instead, the decisions reflect traditional conservative
value choices to limit civil rights and to protect business. The
preemption cases show us that this Emperor really has no
clothes; federalism is used, as it has been so often throughout
American history, to cloak politicized substantive value choices
in a seemingly more neutral and palatable garb.
IV. A DIFFERENT VIEW OF FEDERALISM AND PREEMPTION
For much of American history, and especially in recent
years, courts and scholars have discussed federalism primarily
in terms of limiting federal power so as to protect state
sovereignty. For example, during the first third of this century,
dual federalism was entirely about restricting the authority of
Congress by narrowly defining its powers under Article I and
by reserving a zone of activities to the states. 9 Under the
Burger Court, federalism was used to restrict federal court
authority, such as the invocation of "Our Federalism" in
Younger v. Harris,which held that federal courts must abstain
from decisions that would interfere with ongoing state court
proceedings.60 Most recently, in the 1990s, in cases such as New
York v. United States," United States v. Lopez," and Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida,' the Court has invoked federalism
sued for violating the family leave provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act, and
in Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004), the Court ruled that state governments
may be sued under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act when the
fundamental right of access to the courts is implicated.
" See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Hammer v.
Dagenhart (The Child Labor Case), 247 U.S. 251 (1918); United States v. E.C. Knight
Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (invalidating federal laws as exceeding the scope of Congress'
commerce clause authority or as violating the Tenth Amendment).
" 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See also Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v.
McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981) (using federalism as a basis for precluding federal court
review of the constitutionality of state taxes); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976)
(using federalism as a basis for precluding federal court review of systematic police
abuse).
. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (declaring unconstitutional a federal law as violating
the Tenth Amendment because it coerced state legislative and regulatory activity).
" 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (declaring unconstitutional the federal Gun Free
School Zones Act as exceeding the scope of Congress' commerce clause authority).
517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress may not override the Eleventh
Amendment except if acting under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and that
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to protect states from federal laws and federal courts. The
preemption decisions are also about limiting power, although
the traditional dynamic is reversed. As described in the first
part of this paper, the Supreme Court's preemption decisions
have used federalism as a limit on state power and as
explained in Part II, the limits have frustrated desirable state
policy choices. As argued above, these rulings undermine the
underlying values of federalism.
There is another, dramatically different way of looking
at federalism: seeing its function as empowering government,
not merely imposing limits. As we enter the twenty-first
century, American government faces, and will continue to face,
enormous social problems with which it must deal. In this
regard, federalism can make a crucial difference. The value of
having multiple levels of government lies in having many
institutions capable of acting to solve social problems. From
this perspective, federalism should be viewed as not being
about limits on any level of government, but empowering each
to act to solve difficult social issues.Seeing federalism as furthering empowerment would
mean broadly defining the scope of federal powers under the
Commerce Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as the Supreme Court did between 1937 and the
1990s. The Tenth Amendment would not be regarded as a limit
on Congress, except as a reminder that Congress could legislate
only if it had express or implied powers.' Sovereign immunity
would be abolished as a limit on the ability to enforce federal
laws against state governments.' Defending all of this is, of
course, beyond the scope of this paper.
However, my specific focus here is on preemption and
what federalism as empowerment would mean in this
particular regard. A key way of empowering state and local
governments is by lessening the circumstances under which
there is preemption by federal law. I propose that preemption
should be found only in two circumstances: where a federal law
expressly preempts state law, and where federal and state law
state officers may not be sued pursuant to federal laws that contain a comprehensive
enforcement mechanism).
For an argument that this conception of federalism is in accord with the
design of the Constitution and is historically supported, see Deborah J. Merritt,
Federalismas Empowerment, 47 U. FLA. L. REV. 541 (1995).
United States v. Darby, 12 U.S. 100 (1941).
SI defend this proposition in Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign
Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201 (2001).
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are mutually exclusive. This would preserve the ability of
Congress to preempt state law whenever it deemed that to be
in the nation's interest. It also would preserve the supremacy
of federal law by ensuring that any conflict between the levels
of government would be resolved in favor of federal power. But
it would dramatically limit the ability of federal courts to find
preemption based on inferences concerning congressional
intent or because of a dormant power of the federal
government. This approach to preemption would have produced
the opposite results in Geier, Lorillard, Crosby, and
Garamendi.
For example, in Geier, there was not only no express
preemption or conflict with federal law, but a federal statutory
provision expressly preserving state law claims. In Lorillard,
too, there was nothing in the federal law that limited the
ability of states to regulate the location of tobacco
advertisements and no conflict between the Massachusetts law
and federal law. In Crosby and Garamendi, the federal
government certainly could act to prevent such state laws; but
it never did. No federal statute expressly limited the ability of
states to decide the businesses they would contract with or to
require insurance companies to disclose information. Nor do
these requirements conflict with any federal statute. A
narrower view of preemption, as I urge, would have found
preemption in none of these cases.
This, of course, would not resolve all preemption issues.
As evidenced by the countless cases concerning ERISA
preemption,67 even explicit preemption provisions require
interpretation as to their scope and application. Similarly, the
issue of whether a state law conflicts with a federal law is often
disputed and the determination depends on how the purpose of
each is conceptualized. But limiting preemption in this way
would go a long way toward empowering state and local
governments to have more authority to reflect the choices of
their residents, to experiment, and most important, to advance
liberty and freedom.
An important example of this is the events surrounding
the decision in ACLU of New Jersey v. County of Hudson.'
6"

For a discussion of this issue, see Chemerinsky, Does FederalismAdvance

Liberty?, supra note 51; Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, supra note
66; Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalismand Functionalism in FederalismAnalysis, 13 GA.
ST. U. L. REv. 959 (1997).
799 A.2d 629 (2002).
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After September 11, 2001, the federal government detained a
large number of individuals, many in state prisons and jails.
Many were held in New Jersey's prisons. Although the federal
government refused to disclose the number held or their
identities, the American Civil Liberties Union sued under New
Jersey law to gain information. Specifically, it sued counties,
who held detainees for the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) in their jails, to disclose information on detainees
pursuant to New Jersey's Right-to-Know Law and Jailkeeper's
Law. The Jailkeeper's law, which is meant to prevent secret
detentions, provides:
The keeper of every jail or other penal or reformatory institution
supported by public moneys of any county or municipality, shall keep
a book provided by the board of freeholders in the county where the
institution shall be, in which he shall set forth the date of entry, date
of discharge, the description, age, birthplace and such other
information as he may be able to obtain as to the inmates committed
to his care, which book shall be exposed in a conspicuous place in the
institution and shall be open to public inspection.'

The Superior Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. But
the General Counsel of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) directed the county jails to refuse to answer such
requests for information. Also, the United States intervened in
the litigation. The INS promulgated a new regulation directing
state and local authorities to keep secret information
concerning detainees, even when state or local law requires
disclosure."0
The New Jersey Court of Appeals then found that this
regulation preempted New Jersey laws and required that
information concerning the detainees be kept secret. The New
Jersey court found that the new regulation was within the
scope of Congress's powers: "[Wie conclude that the regulation
was promulgated within the scope of the Commissioner's
delegated authority. The judgment of the Commissioner that
information concerning INS detainees should not be divulged
falls well within the discretion afforded him by the INA
[Immigration and Nationality Act]. The court concluded that
New Jersey law was preempted by federal law:
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:8-16 (West 2002).
Rule, Release of Information Regarding Immigration and
Naturalization Service Detainees in Non-FederalFacilities, 67 Fed. Reg. 19,508 (Apr.
22, 2002), as confirmed at 68 Fed. Reg. 4364 (Jan. 29, 2003) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §
236.6).
70 Interim

71

799 A.2d at 650.
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The issues before us do not concern merely the ministerial
functioning of State officials under State law, or the State's choice to
house federal prisoners. Rather, they involve the nature and scope of
information that must be made available to the public concerning
INS detainees. The power to regulate matters relating to
immigration and naturalization resides exclusively in the federal
government. The State simply has no constitutionally recognized
role in this area. Thus, while the State possesses sovereign authority
over the operation of its jails, it may not operate them, in respect of
INS detainees, in any way that derogates the federal government's
exclusive and expressed interest in regulating aliens.72

What is troubling about this ruling is that preemption
was found even though no federal statute expressly or
implicitly preempted state law. Moreover, the New Jersey court
admitted that there was no conflict between federal law and
state law. Nonetheless, preemption was found. A narrower
view of preemption, such as I argue for, would have come to an
opposite conclusion. If Congress wants to preempt such state
laws, it may do so. But until then, states should be accorded
the power to act. Rejecting preemption would have better
served the goals of federalism: advancing liberty, preventing a
power - secret detentions - that runs the risk of tyrannical
government action, and allowing states to be laboratories for
experimentation.
V.

CONCLUSION

Federalism is often misdefined as synonymous with
states' rights. A better view of federalism conceives of its
purpose as the proper allocation of authority between the
federal and state governments. The structure of government is
not an end in itself, but rather a means to the end of effective
government that minimizes the possibility of tyrannical rule,
provides for the related goal of greater accountability, and sets
the stage for vigorous experimentation. The Supreme Court's
federalism decisions of the last decade - both those limiting
Congress's powers and finding preemption of state law - are
unrelated to, and indeed inconsistent with, the underlying
values of federalism.
In this Article, I have focused on the Supreme Court's
preemption decisions and argued that they conflict with the
presumption against preemption and that they have frustrated
desirable social policy. I argue for an alternative vision that
72 Id. at 654.
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would greatly narrow preemption and focus instead on
empowering government at all levels to deal with social
problems.
Power, of course, can be used for good or for ill. States
might use their greater authority not to protect consumers and
advance individual freedom, but for more pernicious objectives.
Empowering government can be bad. But I do not argue for
unlimited state power; Congress still could preempt state
actions and courts, of course, could invalidate laws that conflict
with the Constitution and federal law. At the same time,
desirable federal laws advancing freedom - such as the
Violence Against Women Act and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act - would be preserved. Simply put, it is time to
replace a formalistic view of "federalism as limits" with a
functional approach to federalism as a means of empowerment.

